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The constructive role that national courts can play in the evolu-
tion of international law, particularly with respect to individual
rights, was demonstrated once again by the decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.'
The court was, of course, careful to establish the basis of its
jurisdiction under its national law, both statutory and decisional.
The jurisdictional issue raised was whether a tort had been
committed under the 1789 Judiciary Act, which includes torts
"committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."2 The essential question was whether judicial
redress for violation of the human rights of the deceased, Joelito
Filartiga, kidnapped and tortured to death in Paraguay, was
available to his father and sister against the alleged torturer,
Norberto Pena-Irala who was the Inspector General of Police in
Asuncion, Paraguay. All the persons involved were Paraguayans
at the time of the event.
The court, in an opinion by Judge Kaufman, recognized that the
act committed against Joelito Filartiga amounted to a tort under
Paraguayan law and would certainly have been a tort under the
forum law in the United States. The issue remained as to the law
applicable to the tort once it was decided that for jurisdictional
purposes the tort violated international law. The court's im-
mediate task was to decide whether torture violated international
law for purposes of taking jurisdiction.
It is well established under international law that a host state
breaches its responsibility toward the state of which an individual
is a national if the host state subjects the individual to treatment
of his or her person below generally accepted standards of state
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630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980).
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responsibility. Since World War II, however, the direct right of in-
dividuals to the protection of their lives and of other civil and
political rights has slowly gained recognition, independent of the
right of redress by states of which they are nationals. Evidently,
the court in the Filartiga case considered that it was timely to
state the present content of international law on this particular
aspect of human rights. The amicus curiae brief by the United
States government' indicated approval by the executive branch of
the robust stand that the court would take in its judgment.
The court, once it had indicated its obligation under the United
States statute to apply international law in the case before it,
found "that an act of torture committed by a state official against
one held in detention violates established norms of the interna-
tional law of human rights, and hence the law of nations."' To arrive
at this conclusion, the court found that international law provides
protection to individuals from torture by any state and its of-
ficials, including the state of which an individual is a national. It
indicated that the United Nations Charter, a treaty to which the
United States is a party, "makes it clear that in this modern age a
state's treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international
concern," although the court admitted that in previous cases it
had not found the Charter's broad mandate to be wholly self-
executing.5
The rule prohibiting torture "has become part of customary in-
ternational law . . . .'" In discussing the sources of international
law, Judge Kaufman quoted from the Paquete Habana and, in a
footnote, quoted article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (I.C.J.). Thus, in choosing the source for its rule of
international law prohibiting torture, the court selected a tradi-
tionally approved source for international law-custom. To be
sure, the court moved cautiously into human rights law, a complex
subject upon which universal consensus is partial at best.
However, the court appeared to be secure in its conclusion that
"there is at present no dissent from the view that the guarantees
include at a bare minimum, the right to be free from torture."'
The court then set about to demonstrate how the rule against tor-
ture contravenes customary international law.
' Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2nd Cir. 1980).
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 880.
Id at 881.
Id. at 882.
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The first document, other than the U.N. Charter, used by the
court is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' which was
said to evidence and define the customary international law pro-
hibition against torture. The court considered as "particularly
relevant" the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From
Being Subjected to Torture.' Both these declarations were
adopted by the General Assembly without dissent.
Judge Kaufman then cited experts in the field. Professor Sohn
was quoted for the proposition that the declarations have clarified
the obligation of states in the Charter to promote human rights."0
The U.N. Office of Legal Affairs was quoted on the formal and
solemn nature of the declaration of the General Assembly
Declaration. This 1962 memorandum goes on to state that a
declaration creates an expectation of adherence, and "insofar as
the expectation is gradually justified by state practice, a declara-
tion may by custom become recognized as laying down rules bind-
ing upon the states.""
The court then addressed treaty law and found that "interna-
tional consensus surrounding torture has found expression in
numerous international treaties and accords." Cited were
multilateral treaties to which the U.S. has not adhered, such as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 2 Treaty
law here was used as part of the evidence on "the modern usage
and practice of nations."'3 Another source for the consensus on the
issue of torture reflects the substance of the international
agreements: national law. The court mentioned a survey accord-
ing to which torture is prohibited "expressly or implicitly, by the
constitutions of over fifty-five nations, including both the United
States and Paraguay."'4 Earlier in his opinion, Judge Kaufman in-
dicated that eighteen states have incorporated the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights into their own constitutions.
Although the court stated that it was relying on custom for its
conclusion, it would appear that, in fact, its sources for an interna-
tional law rule on the prohibition of torture were diverse and
novel and that they had been placed within the mold of customary
' G.A. Res. 217 (Ill) (A), Dec. 10, 1948.
' G.A. Res. 3452, Dec. 1975.
630 F. 2d at 883.
II d.
G.A. Res. 2200 A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52-58, U.N. Doc A/6316 (1966). As a
treaty, it entered into force on March 23, 1976.
" 630 F.2d at 883.
" Id at 884.
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law in order to conform with traditional views, particularly in U.S.
case law, on the sources of international law.
The notion that all individuals have rights independent of what
may be granted to them under national law, including their own
national law, adds a dimension to international law unknown to it
when the sources of the law of nations were set forth in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. The principal organs of in-
ternational organizations have been playing a major role in this
area. Foremost among these is, of course, the U.N. General
Assembly.
The General Assembly "Declaration" is, according to the
Charter, a recommendation to states. Technically, it resembles all
resolutions of that organ. However, it seems logical to assume
that "declarations" or "charters" or however these instruments
are denominated, reflect a consensus on the law by the interna-
tional community, as presently organized politically, and therefore
have a different purpose from the many General Assembly recom-
mendations that deal with day-to-day issues.' This is particularly
true, it would appear, with respect to the fundamental rights of in-
dividuals. The General Assembly is presently the sole multilateral
political organ with universal membership of states charged with
the vindication and maintenance of the rights of the individual, as
set forth in the United Nations Charter. When it speaks by con-
sensus on an issue of fundamental human rights in declaratory
terms, it must intend to widen the still all-too-narrow dimensions
of human rights law. 6
Should states have a monopoly in the development of the law of
human rights, either in international organizations, through
diplomatic conferences or other conferences, such as the con-
ference at which the Helsinki Accords were adopted, 7 or by
unilateral national action? 8 The law creation process is still
"5 The court in the Filartiga case appeared to accept this view by quoting Schwelb to
that effect. I& at 883.
" It has been recognized, although the consensus is less strong, that human rights are
not confined to political and civil rights, but include economic, social, and cultural rights.
Evidence of such recognition by the international community of states is the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was adopted without dissent by
the General Assembly, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49-52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966). In treaty form, it entered into force January 3, 1976.
" Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Done at Helsinki,
Aug. 1, 1975. See 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1292 (1975).
" Such national action includes the statement of individual rights in national constitu-
tions, codes and other laws, and the creation of administrative units and the use of courts
for the redress of violations of rights. However, national perceptions of human rights vary
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dominated by states, of course. The notion of a universal interna-
tional legislative organ directly elected by constituencies of in-
dividuals, perhaps based on the example of the so-called European
Parliament, is considered futuristic and utopian. However, there
already exist a number of non-governmental organizations
devoted to human rights. One such organization, which is composed
of groups of individuals from throughout much of the world, is
Amnesty International. Another such organization is the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists,, which brings together members of
the legal profession from much of the world. Can such groupings
of individuals be brought into the norm-creating process in the
area of human rights?
Although the court in the Filartiga case stopped far short of
recognizing new sources of international law, it did expand the
concept of customary law to include a bundle of multilateral state
actions. This perception of customary law enabled the court to
conclude that international law prohibits the use of torture by
Paraguayan officials and that the court has the jurisdiction to
hear a complaint by an alien based on the tort of torture. What
about a tort action in the Second Circuit by a U.S. citizen for tor-
ture by a foreign state official, or by a federal or state official in
the United States? Would the Second Circuit enforce a money
judgment in a tort action based on torture made in favor of a U.S.
citizen domiciled abroad against a federal or state official, even if
judicial jurisdiction recognized under American legal principles
had been gained over the official? The court in the Filartiga case
boldly asserted: "The treaties and accords stated above, as well as
the express foreign policy of our own government, all make it
clear that international law confers fundamental rights upon all
people vis-a-vis their own governments."'9 Would this valiant
declaration by a forward-looking and humane appellate court be
upheld by the national courts elsewhere, or by the United States
Supreme Court for that matter?
In much of the world, the issue of the possible means of redress
for breaches of international law is intimately connected with the
effectiveness of the national legal system. The role of national
institutions and particularly of national courts in interpreting and
enforcing international law, either as directly applicable substan-
greatly, and redress within national contexts will often be non-existent or formal rather
than real.
" 630 F.2d at 885.
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tive rules replacing national law or as a minimum standard, has
long been debated. Georges Scelle maintained in his Cours de
Droit International Public, published in 1948, that "the interna-
tional legal system can make progress only in coming closer to being
a supranational legal system." 2 The dual function (dddoublement
fonctionnel) of national governments as organs of both the na-
tional and international legal systems was conceded by Scelle who
suggested, however, that it was a dangerous substitute for the in-
stitutional organization of international legal orders. 21 This skep-
ticism regarding the concept of the dddoublement fonctionnel was
shared by Wolfgang Friedmann, who asserted that it "conceals the
tension between the policy orientation of national courts or of-
ficials interpreting international law, and the policy orientation of
the international order, which requires at least some degree of
subordination of national policies to international law. '
The courts in some countries, like the United States Supreme
Court in the Sabbatino case,23 exercise their power of determining
the state of international law rules, even in sensitive economic areas,
without succumbing to the urge to find that the law necessarily
favors their nationals or governments. However, in the still more
sensitive areas of individual rights, it would be even more difficult
for national courts to take up the challenge posed in the concept of
dddoublement fonctionnel and base the various elements of their
jurisdiction on international law without reference to the national
version of such law, including local public policy. Nevertheless,
the utility of national courts in enforcing the rights of individuals
in certain circumstances should be recognized, even if the enforce-
ment takes place only because national law authorizes such en-
forcement.
Human rights enforcement on a regional level has become a
reality in Western Europe and in the Americas. Based on
multilateral treaties, under the auspices of the Council of Europe
on the one hand and the Organization of American States on the
other, organs have been created that have supranational powers
20 G. SCELLE, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 22 (1948). The translation is that of
this author. The original text reads "... l'ordre juridique international ne peut faire de pro-
gres qu'en se rapprochant d'un ordre juridique supranational."
2 Id. Scelle stated: "La Ioi du dddoublement fonctionnel est le succ6dan6 de l'organisa-
tion institutionelle ddfaillante des ordres juridiques internationaux."
22 W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (1964).
' Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Note the reference to the
Sabbatino case by the court in the Filartiga case in support of the Supreme Court's ex-
amination of the law on the issue of expropriation of foreign-owned assets.
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with respect to the recognition of individual rights of nationals of
Member States. ' Regional systems that have both administrative
and judicial organs represent a most significant advance in the
practical problem of the search by individuals for the vindication
of rights recognized under international law.
An effective universal system for redress of individual rights
has yet to be fashioned. The petition system within the United Na-
tions, while also representing some advance, cannot in its present
form fulfill the tasks that could be said to be assigned to it by
the existence of consensus on at least a few areas of individual
rights.25 The role of non-governmental international human rights
organizations will be to continue to put pressure on those who
control the present means of redress, particularly through the
dissemination of information and the giving of counsel when possi-
ble, and to push for the creation of effective regional, suprana-
tional, and ultimately universal administrative and judicial organs
for the redress of violations of the rights of individuals.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Filartiga
case found that torture is a violation of international law and ap-
peared to be ready to have the rule applied to the allegations
made by the plaintiffs. This cannot help but encourage those who
seek to widen the scope of protection for the individual against
abuse of the political, economic, and social power of states and
those who control them.
24 It may also be suggested that the European Communities' organs have served to vin-
dicate economic and social rights of nationals of Member States.
2 For a recent discussion of the petition system under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (article 28 established the Human Rights Committee), which clearly
describes and analyzes the system, see Zuijdwijk, The Right to Petition the United Nations
Because of Alleged Violations of Human Rights, 59 CANADIAN BAR REV: 103 (1981).
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